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STATE OF UTAH,
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Case No.

GEORGE RAY NEELEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

12423

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF 'l'HE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the conviction of George
Ray Nt>eley for the crime of receiving stolen property in
violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-38-12 (1953).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
George Ray Neeley was convicted of the crime of
rf'eeiving stolen property in violation of Utah Code Ann.
• IG-3S-12 (195:3) on December 17, 1970, following a jury
trial. Th<' HonorahlP .Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge, Third
Judicial Di strict court, presided.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that this Court should affirm the District Court's verdict.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent agrees with the statement of fac~
set out by appellant, subject to the following additions:
1. Both Helen Warnick and Guy Warnick made
positive identifications of the coins in Exhibits 3.11
(Tr. 8-32).

2. Dennis Madrid had personally told Neeley that
the coins had been stolen but lied to him as to the locality in which the theft of the coins took place - probably
to mislead Neeley as to the danger of trying to fence the
coins in Salt Lake City (Tr. pp. 29 and 32). Nevertheless, it appears from the testimony of Madrid that
Neeley was fully aware of the fact that the coins had
been stolen when he purchased them from Madrid and ·
his accomplice.

3. Although Charles Pearson, a local coin dealer, ,
claimed he had inspected the coins before he sold them ,
to Neeley, he could not single out one coin, with certain~,
as a coin he sold to Neeley. However, the State's wit·
nesses positively identified certain distinguishing marki '
that only they would recognize, since they initially pur·
chased the coins, knowing full well the structural flaw5
·
· They ad·
inherent upon the faces of the various
corns.
mitted at trial having purchased certain coins becans.eof
.
unusual or strange markings
on the f aces of the vartolli
coins. (T. pp.13-25).
1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND REVIEWED
BY THE JURY WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
THE JUDGMENT OF GUILTY RENDERED BY THE
DISTRICT COURT.

Due to the precarious nature of the crime of receiYing stolen property, many times the testimony presented in order to obtain a conviction must be obtained
from the actual participants in the particular burglary or
lmwny, due to the lack of external eyewitness testimony.
In the present case, ample evidence was introduced at
trial which was taken and received by the jury as proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that Neeley committed the
crime alleged.
In this case, as in most, the testimony, both pro and
con, at points, was not as clear as we would expect in an
open and shut case. However, it was the responsibility
of the jury to sift through this evidence by weighing the
credibility of the various witnesses' testimony in a search
for the truth:
"The question of the credibility of the witness
is for the jury and, if there is competent evidence
upon which reasonable and unpredjudicial minds
might draw different conclusions, the jury's findings will not be disturbed." State v. Roberts, 91
Utah 117, 63 P.2d584 (1937).
Counsel for appellant attacks the credibility of
Madrid, labeling him an accomplice to the crime for
which Neeley was charged. Yet the Supreme Court of

•
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POINT II
THE COURT CORRECTLY ALLOWED THE JN.
FORMATION TO BE AMENDED TO "ON OR
ABOUT THE 9TH DAY OF JULY," RATHER THAN
THE 13TH. COUNSELS' ATTEMPT TO SHOW A
NEED FOR CONFORMING THE EVIDENCE TO
THE INFORMATION WAS NOT SUBSTANTIAL
ENOUGH TO GRANT A MOTION TO DISMISS.

It has been held where a defendant is not misled or
prejudiced in making his defense by the allegation cou
cerning the date of the crime charged, that the date is '
unimportant, and a conviction may properly follow upon
sufficient proof of the commission of the offense at an:
time within the provisions of the statute of limitations.
State v. Bayes, 47 U. 474, 478, 155 P. 355 (1916):
"Where time is not of the essence of the criln1,
exact time is immaterial, and if evidence other.
wise supports charge relied upon by prosecution,
conviction may not be set aside because crilne
was committed after date charged in information
or indictment, so long as it was committed prior .
to bringing of prosecution." State v. Distefa1v
70U. 586, 262 P.113 (1927).
1
•

This Distefano holding is based upon Utah Code •
Ann.~

77-21-12 (1953) which states:

"An information or indictment need contain ·
no allegation of the time of the commission of ilie 1
.
. nece ssarv
to
offense unless such allegation
is
·1
charge the offense under Section 77-21-8." (Em·
phasis added.)
.
Subsections (2) and (3) of Utah Code Ann. ;
77-21-43 (1953) affirm the broad leeway granted proit·
cu tors in amending criminal pleadings:
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" ( 2) No variance between those allegations
ol' an information, indictment or bill of particulars, which state the particulars of the offense,
wltl'lher amended or not, and the evidence offered
in support thereof shall be grounds for the acquittal of defondant. The court may at any time cause
the information, indictment or bill of particulars
to be amended in respect to any such variance to
conform to the evidence. (Emphasis added.)
" ( 3) If the court is of the opinion that the
defendant has been prejudiced in his defense upon
the merits by any such defect, imperfection or
omission by any such variance the court may because of such variance ... unless the defendant
objects, postpone the trial, to be had before same
or another jury, on such tenns as the court considers proper. In determining whether the defendant has been prejudiced in his defense upon
the merits, the court shall consider all the circumstances of the case and the entire course of the
prosecution."

•••
"In cases of this nature the crucial point is
whether the defendant was in any way prejudiced
because of the discrepancy in dates or the manner in which the appellant was charged in the information." Jones Id. at 290. (State v. Robinson,
190 Kan. 771, 370 P.2dw 37 (1963) ).
One of the issues raised with the case at bar was precisely what date the crime of burglary and receiving the
stolen goods occurred. Filling out the exact date was
practically impossible when we consider the fact that the
Warnicks were out of town for over a week during which
time the burglary occurred. Therefore, Neeley could

have recei\'ed the goods anywhere from the 1tl .
'
•
'1: 1 ol Juh
'
to the 10th. 'Ihe precise date would also be l d · ·
.
c ou ea 111
the fact
that the tnal took place almost six, 111011 ti,1~ afte1·
.
t~1e crnne had occurred; but with the positive identifita.
hon of certain coins by the Warnicks the 'i' 111 e f
'
'
"
act1;r
would not be a substantial element of the crime. In
United States v. Covington, 411 F.2d 108G (-Hh Cir. C.A.
1969), the Court said at page 1087:
1

"In testing the sufficiency of an indictment.
the alleged date of the offense is not ordinarih
considered a material allegation." 4 Barron, Fed.
eral Practice and Procedure, §1913 (Rules Erl.
1951).

1

And further a page 1088 :
'Except when time is of the essence of the
offense, the prosecution is not confined in its e\'i.
dence to the precise date laid in the indictment, 1
but may prove that the offense was committed
on some other day prior to the commencement or
the prosecution and within the period of limita- :
tions, and such proof does not constitute a material variance." Id. at 1088. 42 C.J.S., Indictment! 1
and Informations,§ 257 (1944).
1
I

The Court stated that time is essential.
" ... as where it constitutes an element of '.he I
crime, or where accused having been trie.d lo'. 1
another and similar offense within the penod Ol r
limitations, proof of th~ exac~ date is necessarr ~ 1
show that he is not bemg tned for the same ·
f ense · or where two offenses have been com·
. dgmen' 1
mitted' to ' enable accused to plead t he JU
0
in the present prosecution in the event of a secont 11
· nece ssan·
prosecution; or where the date 1s

0
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Pnable the court to impose the proper sentence
... " 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Information, ~
257, at 1279 (1944).
1'irne may also be sub:::;tantial in preparing an alibi
wlti:'re defense counsel i:::; '':::;urprised" by the changing of
t!H'. time in the information. Like the Covington case,
however, the courts must look at the circumstances involved behind the change, as well as the time in which
tlw information was filed and the time of trial.
had better than four months to prepare any
possible alibis concerning the charges. The coins were
seized on the J 0th day of July, and the information was
prrpared to read the 13th of July. Therefore, Neeley
knowing that certain coins had been stolen sometime
prior to the 10th could have retained counsel, found out
about the elates in question, and established his alibi,
even th011gh the information said the 13th.
N<~eley

The Utah statutes afford great latitude and discretion to the trial judge in amending the pleadings of
either party:

"An information may be amended, without
leave of court, in any matter of form or substance at any time before the defendant pleads
thereto. It may also be amended in any matter
of form or substance, by leave of court, at any
time after the defendant has pleaded to the
merits, or during the trial. In case an amendment
is allowed after a plea or during trial, the court
shall give the defendant such reasonable time as
may be necessary to meet the new matter set up
in the amendment. No amendment shall cause any

10

delay of trial, except for good cause mad to
•
pear t? the satisfaction of the court, an; unl:;1;
the defendant
. shall cause any reason he niay haw··
w l1y th e tnal shall not forthwith proceed t b
p~esented to ~he trial co-i:rt, he shall not be ~r·rt
m1ttedd to rey1ew the ruling of the court on th,
amen ment in the Supreme Coitrt." Utah c0d
Ann.§ 77-17-3 (1953).
e
Appellant failed to carry the burden of showing that
the trial court, in granting the state's amendment as tii
the date of the alleged commission of the crime, was in
a:ny way prejudicial. Neeley had better than six rnonth1
to prepare his case. At trial the court granted a smn
day continuance in lieu of the amendment made to the information. Any prejudicial consequences could haw
been corrected at that time.

1
1

POINT III
NEELEY'S THIRD ARGUMENT IS TOTALLY
WITHOUT MERIT WHEN VIEWED IN THE LIGHT
OF SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVITS ORDERED
INTO THE TRIAL RECORD WHICH SHOW THAT
NOTICE AND REPRESENTATION OF COUNSEL
WERE AFFORDED APPELLANT WHEN THE
ADDITIONAL JURY INSTRUCT'ION WAS GIVEN.
NO PREJUDICIAL ERRORS WERE COMMITTED.

1

Upon motion by the State and the order of th~
Court allowing supplemental affidavits to be made part 1
of the trial record Neeley's third argument raisedinhi;
brief is rendered 'moot. The State agrees in part mili ·
Neeley's contention that Rule 47(n) of the UtahRulesof
Civil Procedure requires a mandatory attendance or

11

noticn to ddendant and/or defense counsel when additional jnry instructions are given. It is for this very
reason that Neeley's third argument is rendered moot.
Affidavits were submitted by the Honorable Judge
Joseph Jeppson, Richard S. Shepherd, the Deputy
Distriet Attorney, and Walter R. Ellett, counsel representing defendant, George Ray Neeley. Both Shepherd
and Ellett submitted affidavits to the fact that:
"After the case had been submitted to the
jury, there was a request for an additional instruction. The matter was discussed among Richard S. Shepherd, Walter R. Ellett and Judge
Jeppson and after the discussion, an additional
instruction was drafted and submitted to the
jury."
Paragrph 4 of the Honorable Judge J eppson's affidavit states:
"That in the presence of Richard S. Shepherd,
Deputy District Attorney, and Walter R. Ellett,
counsel for defendant above named, I prepared an
additional instruction which is set forth at page
146 of the record on appeal."
Both notice and attendance by Mr. Ellett at the
District.Judge's request were granted during the drafting
and submission of the written additional instruction.
Originally Judge Jeppson had prepared a differently
worded instruction to be submitted to the jury for deliberation. However, a the insistence of defense counsel,
the instruction was changed so as to read identically to
that found in the record at page 146.

q

12

Although receipt of the "crolu
certificate,, \Va~
. in.
.
to
eluded in the information charging· defendant , no <11._.
dence of its being received by Neeley was presented at
trial. Naturally the jury would be somewhat confused bv
its inclusion within the record, as well as the questio~
of its being included in the assessment of value for
determination of the extent and degree of the crime. If
anything can be said with certainty about the supplemental instruction it certainly would include the fact that
the instruction seemed more to protect Neeley's right~
than to prejudice them in any way. By requiring !lie
jury to look to the other property received in detennination of value, instead of the gold certificate, the $50.00
limit for a felony charge may very well have not been
met, thus limiting N eeley's criminal liability to a possible
misdemeanor.
As stated in the case of Blevins v. Commonwealth,
209 Va. 622, 166 S.E.2d 325,, 330 (1969), the Court held:
"Not only has the trial court got the right but
it has a duty to amend instructions which appear
to be erroneous or misleading, after summat10n
by counsel and after the jury has retired to con·
sider a verdict. In the case at bar the m~re fae~
that the instruction was amended at such time~
not constitute grounds for mistrial and awarding
of new trial."

It is obvious from a reading of the jury instructiW
as a whole that the issues of fact and law stated and
fficient tD
raised by the trial judge were more than su
·ed
· ht f the aceu~ ·
fairly represent and safeguard the ng so

13
the pres1mce of the district attorney and
rouu~d for def em;e, rendered the clarifying instructions
to limit the possibility that the jury might construe evidencP, not actually received at trial, against the defendant. Any errors raised by Neeley as to the additional
instruction seemed beneficially to limit his criminal liability:
Thi~ judge, i11

"After hearing on appeal the court must give
judgment without regard to errors or defects
which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties. If error has been committed, it shall not
be presumed to have resulted in prejudice. The
comt must be satisfied that it has that effect before it is warranted in reversing judgment." Utah
Code Ann.~ 77-42-1 (1953).
Supporting the presumption of Utah Code Ann. §
77-42-1 (1953) as related to jury instructions is the case
of State v. Hines, 6 Utah 2d 126, 307 P.2d 887 (1957)
which states :
"An instruction sufficiently covering the subject of defendants' failure to testify although not
a model instruction on that subject was not
prejudicial when considered with other instructions." See also State v. Peterson, 121 U. 229, 24
P.2d 504 (1953) .

14
CONCLUSION
For the reasons enumerated herein, respondent sub.
mits that under the facts of the case no injustice wa.1
committed against Neeley either by admission of testimony, amending of the information or the supplemental
jury instruction regarding the gold certificate. Certainly
N eeley's brief fails to raise incidents of reversible error
which denied him due process of law as portrayed by the
record. Therefore, respondent· respectfully submits that
the jury verdict and conviction in the court of the Honor.
able Judge of the Third District should thereby be af.
firmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VE·RNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

